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Abstract: This paper considers the recent Danish mosque debate as a debate 
about distribution of public space to a religious minority and asks whether and, 
if so, how the case can be described in terms of tolerance and respect. Tolerance 
and respect are regularly advanced at the level of political theory as concepts and 
values relevant to the handling of minority issues. This paper will use the concepts 
of tolerance and respect in relation to the Danish mosque-debate as expressed in 
political assemblies and public debate in two ways: It will test the applicability of 
the theoretical concepts and in the process draw out some general challenges and 
lessons concerning the practical applicability of these concepts. At the same time 
it will use the concepts as an interpretative framework to present and evaluate 
the actual policies regarding the distribution of public space for the building of 
mosques played out in the case. One lesson drawn from the exercise in application 
is that the concepts have a narrower application than often assumed and that ap-
plication requires differentiation between different potential subjects of tolerance 
and respect.
Keywords: Toleration, respect, public space, mosque, Copenhagen
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the responses to recent requests by Danish Muslims to build 
two prominent mosques in Copenhagen. The paper considers this case as an exam-
ple of how requests by minorities for use of public space are handled. A prominent 
position within the political theory on minority issues proposes to view such cases as 
cases of toleration, which ought furthermore to be handled on the basis of political 
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Program, Project RESPECT (GA no. 244549). Thanks to Laura Enna Winther for research assis-
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mous reviewers.
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values of equal respect (Forst 2010; Galeotti 2002). The theoretical proposal is thus 
both descriptive in that it proposes a certain conceptual framework for describing 
and understanding such cases, and normative. This paper is an empirical inves-
tigation of the Danish case through this conceptual framework of toleration and 
respect asking the descriptive and interpretative question about how the case can be 
understood as involving toleration and respect. The paper simultaneously uses the 
case to suggest that the concepts of toleration and respect have to be understood in 
ways integrating their vertical and horizontal dimensions, i.e. toleration and respect 
as expressed in formal relations between institutional authorities and citizens, on 
the one hand, and informal relationships between citizens, on the other. The study 
of the case reveals how vertical and horizontal issues of toleration and respect can 
be interrelated and intertwined in practice, which complicates the characterisation 
of the case as a whole. The paper is accordingly partly an empirical investigation 
of the case as seen in terms of toleration and respect, partly an inductive argument 
based on this investigation for a two-dimensional and intersectional understanding 
of the concepts as applied to such cases.
Muslims are the largest and most publicly visible and politically debated reli-
gious minority in Denmark but have no places of worship reflecting this status; 
there are only a couple actual mosques built as such in Denmark, none of which 
are big or prominent. Almost all active Muslims in Denmark practice their religion 
in converted factory buildings, warehouses or cellars. Since the eighties there has 
accordingly been a continuous wish for mosques constructed as such according 
to Muslims’ own beliefs about how proper places of worship should be designed, 
reflecting the size of the religious group, and making it publicly visible to a degree 
comparable to other religious groups. Mosque plans have, however, been opposed 
on the basis that Denmark is a Christian, non-immigrant country, and more recently 
on the basis of fear and suspicion of, and outright hostility towards, Muslim and 
Islam as such, often couched in security terms. The present paper investigates the 
most recent phase in this Danish mosque-debate as it has played out in relation to 
two mosque projects in Copenhagen.
The paper proceeds as follows: The conceptual framework and the issues raised 
by two-dimensionality are presented in section 2. The vertical/horizontal distinc-
tion is used to focus the investigation and structure the description of the cases. 
Section 3 presents the political handling of the case in the City Council and the 
political debates in the council and parliament. Section 4 provides a theoretical 
interpretation of this process addressing the questions about vertical toleration and 
applicable sense(s) of toleration. Section 5 presents an empirical investigation of 
public debate in the media conducted to address the horizontal dimension. Section 
6 concludes by discussing the understanding of the case gained by the application 
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of the conceptual framework and the need for an intersectional conception of tol-
eration and respect that it is argued to demonstrate.
2 Conceptual Framework
Toleration is routinely taken to require the presence of two components (Newey 
1999; Forst 2010): (1) an ‘objection component’ or ‘reason for interference’ con-
sisting in some negative attitude on the part of one agent towards the beliefs or 
practices of another which disposes the former agent to suppress, prohibit or oth-
erwise interference with the latter; (2) an ‘acceptance component’ or ‘reason for 
non-interference’ consisting in some positive attitude on the part of the first agent 
which overrides the disposition to interfere. There are accordingly two contrasts to 
toleration: Intolerance (the acceptance component is absent or not strong enough 
and the agent interferes) and cases where the negative attitude is absent, subdivid-
ing into cases of indifference and cases where an agent only has a positive attitude 
towards some other.
The concept of respect is simpler than toleration, since it only involves one at-
titude, and of higher order, since respect may function as the acceptance component 
motivating toleration. Respect is a positive attitude but need not involve a specific 
valuing of another; equal respect rather consists in recognition of the equal status 
of others and the claim on equal consideration this implies. Respect in turn requires 
and may motivate certain forms of action (Galeotti 2010), one of which is tolera-
tion. Respect based toleration obtains if an agent has a negative attitude towards 
the beliefs or practices of someone but nevertheless respects him, e.g. as an equal 
citizen, and therefore does not interfere with the disapproved belief or practice, e.g. 
as a matter of religious freedom.
The concepts of toleration and respect are often invoked in normative discussions 
about how people or states ought to act. But toleration is a descriptive concept and 
respect may be used descriptively, i.e. in a way not taken a normative stand on 
who should be respected and what respect in fact requires. Normative discussions 
presuppose the descriptive applicability of the concepts and the descriptive use of 
the concepts is furthermore of independent interest, since characterisation of cases 
in these terms can provide an understanding of the types of relationships in place 
and the dynamics of controversies and conflicts. The present paper employs the 
conceptual framework of toleration and respect in this descriptive sense.
It might be objected that the concepts are inevitably normatively loaded. This is 
correct in the sense that one reason for considering a case in these terms is to pass 
normative judgement on it, e.g. along the lines of the sketched theoretical proposal. 
But the concepts as such are not necessarily normatively loaded. It is not in itself 
an evaluative judgement (of endorsement or condemnation) to describe an actor as 
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(in)tolerant (Cohen 2004). It is an open question whether specific acts or practices 
should be tolerated; sometimes intolerance is justified. And while ‘disrespect’ might 
imply a negative evaluation, it is also an open question what equal respect requires 
in specific cases. So here one might categorise reasons for action as reasons of 
respect without thereby taking a stance on whether the act or policy thus justified 
is correct or not. Furthermore, the positive and negative attitudes involved in the 
descriptive application of the concepts are simply those voiced by or plausibly 
ascribed to specific actors, not attitudes condoned by the theorist.
Anne Elisabetta Galeotti has proposed toleration as a theoretically fruitful de-
scription of minority groups in modern liberal states; in order to understand the 
position of certain groups, it is necessary to grasp the way in which they are seen 
as different and deviant from the norms and expectations of the majority (Galeotti 
2002). To focus only on liberal state neutrality and the equal rights of members of 
all groups as individual citizens ignores the sense in which these groups are minori-
ties, not just in a quantitative (numerical) sense, but in a qualitative sense having to 
do with asymmetrical power relations ascribing them an identity as different from 
the norm in a negatively valuated way (Lægaard 2008). Minority status may thus 
explain negative reactions to requests from minorities, e.g. for gaining a visible 
presence in public spaces, and that such cases are accordingly properly described 
in terms of toleration.
From a normative point of view, it has further been argued that toleration might 
be insufficient or defective in terms of justice if it leaves the asymmetrical power 
relations in place and merely concede certain permissions to the minority on the 
condition that it acquiesces in its minority position by not challenging the majority 
norms in place. The proposed antidote is to explicitly base policies of toleration on 
appeals to respect for the equal status of members of the minority, which is sup-
posed to counter the repressive character of toleration as mere permission (Forst 
2010) and to symbolise the full inclusion of minorities (Galeotti 2002).
Even this sketchy characterisation indicates that the concepts may be applied to 
cases along two different dimensions depending on who the subjects and objects of 
toleration and respect are: Relations are vertical if the subject is the state or some 
other public authority and the object are citizens or groups in society within the 
jurisdiction and regulative power of the authority. Relations are horizontal if both 
the subject and object are citizens or societal groups. 
Vertical toleration is traditionally associated with absolutist confessional states 
only conceding qualified and conditional permission to religious minorities. Ac-
cording to Rainer Forst, however, a democratic form of this ‘permission concep-
tion’ of toleration is still relevant for understanding debates over what democratic 
rights to religious freedom mean in modern states (2010: 12). Even if liberal states 
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should in principle be religiously neutral in ways precluding official dislike of mi-
nority religions it is not obvious that even quite liberal states are in fact neutral. 
Liberal states might in any event still have other reasons for disapproving of beliefs 
or practices of some citizens (Lægaard 2010a). So there is still use for the descrip-
tive concept of vertical toleration.
Vertical respect is usually considered to be a requirement of liberal justice; liberal 
states are supposed to justify their policies in ways expressing equal respect for all 
citizens. On some ideals of democracy, vertical respect may require citizens as law-
makers to set aside their own religious views when deliberating over how political 
power should be exercised. This is an expression of what Forst calls the ‘respect 
conception’ of toleration (2010: 11). This use of the concept shows that vertical and 
horizontal relations may be intrinsically interrelated: In such ideal models of demo-
cratic decision making, vertical respect presupposes and is a function of horizontal 
respect. I will call such interrelation bottom-up intrinsic intersectionality.
Conversely, intrinsic intersectionality is top-down when the vertical toleration of 
institutions concerns or addresses horizontal relations in society. The two dimen-
sions are then necessarily in play simultaneously, e.g. if the state vertically enforces 
toleration in a horizontal conflict between citizens (Newey 1999). Peter Jones 
(2007) understands political toleration intersectionally as the upholding by the state 
of a regime of toleration in society. The state is then politically tolerant if it prevents 
social intolerance, even if it does not itself have negative attitudes towards the 
practices or beliefs in question. Galeotti’s idea of toleration as recognition (2002) 
is also a form of top-down intrinsic intersectionality: She argues that states should 
tolerate minorities and publicly justify toleration with reference to the equal status 
of members of minorities in order to include them as full citizens, which is partly 
a matter of the social perceptions that other citizens have of minorities (Lægaard 
2008). These examples illustrate how the application of the concepts of toleration 
and respect sometimes has to be two-dimensional and that the intersection of the 
two dimensions is essential to understanding the applicable sense of toleration or 
respect, whether as descriptive characterisations or normative ideals.
Relations of toleration and respect may also be extrinsically intersectional. This 
would mean that there is a contingent connection between, e.g., the vertical tolera-
tion of public authorities and horizontal toleration in society. One example of such 
a connection might be when vertical toleration brings about horizontal toleration. 
But there are other possibilities of such intersectional dynamics of toleration and 
respect.
My claim now is that in order to apply the concepts of toleration and respect, we 
need to take two-dimensionality and intersectionality, intrinsic as well as extrin-
sic, into account. As part of a descriptive characterisation of a case, one does not 
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understand how the case is one of toleration or respect if one ignores intersectional-
ity. I will use the Danish mosque case to illustrate the distinction between vertical 
and horizontal relations, how the adoption of this conceptual framework is empiri-
cally informative, e.g. in the way it reveals intersectional dynamics of toleration 
and respect, and how the characterisation and understanding of the case as one of 
toleration and respect requires attention to intersectionality.
3 The Political Process2
Since the early eighties, the Danish state has designated a plot on the island of 
Amager, just outside the city centre of Copenhagen, as a potential building site for 
a mosque (Jacobsen 2008). The site was formerly the location of an artillery bat-
tery as part of the city fortifications and is therefore referred to as the ‘Stationary 
Battery’. Since 1992 the plot has been regulated by a district plan designating part 
of the area for the building of ‘cultural institutions’, for instance a mosque. Several 
projects for building a mosque on the Battery plot never got off the ground, mainly 
because of lack of funding.
In 2006, the Battery plot was acquired from the state by a private investor and 
real estate developer who wanted to realise a spectacular building project involving 
several high rises. In cooperation with the municipal building administration the 
developer sought a partner to represent the Muslims who would use the mosque 
mentioned in the existing district plan, which the municipality required be built 
as part of the first phase of the project. In 2008 the developer reached an agree-
ment with a newly formed organisation called the ‘Muslim Council’ [Muslimernes 
Fællesråd] allegedly representing a broad range of Sunni Muslim communities in 
Denmark, which was supposed to raise funds for the mosque. In 2009 preparatory 
work on a new district plan for the Battery plot began. The plans were discussed in 
November 2009 in the city council’s Technical- and Environmental committee be-
cause of disagreements between the developer and the Muslims’ Council over the 
plans for the mosque as well as apparent difficulties in raising the necessary funds.
But at this point the Battery mosque project had been overtaken by another 
project. On the other side of Copenhagen, the Shia Islamic religious association 
Ahlul Bait owns an old mechanical workshop. In 2009 the association applied to 
the municipality for permission to demolish the existing building and erect in its 
stead a proper mosque in traditional Shia Islamic style with dome and minarets (not 
to be used for calls to prayer).
2 The description of the political process is based on the official agendas, minutes and annexed 
notes and documents for the meetings of the City Council and the Technical and Environmental 
Committee found (in Danish) on the homepage of the City of Copenhagen www.kk.dk These 
documents do not appear in the list of references but are on file with the author.
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According to the Danish planning act, local councils are required to draw up 
district plans before large scale construction works take place, which set out the 
limits and requirements concerning use, access, plot ratio, building height, location 
and exterior, parking opportunities etc. Both the Ahlul Bait mosque and the Battery 
project require changes in the district plans. The drawing up of district plans is 
a practical planning issue, and therefore usually a routine matter. But when the draft 
proposal for a district plan for the Ahlul Bait mosque was approved by the Techni-
cal and Environmental committee in June 2009, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) 
representative on the committee requested a full political debate about the case 
in the city council. She claimed that so-called ‘grand-mosques’ disturb the public 
order and attract extremist Muslims, obstruct integration and further segregation. 
The representative of the liberal party did not have any objections to the building 
of a mosque as such, but objected to the proposed project on the grounds that the 
traditional Shia style mosque would not fit architecturally into the area.
When the draft district plan was discussed in the city council in August 2009, 
the DPP representatives further argued against the mosque, claiming that Islam is 
opposed to gender equality and democracy and involves antiquated cultural norms 
concerning family patterns, upbringing and violence. The DPP representatives ob-
jected to permitting erection of a ‘monument’ allegedly publicly symbolising such 
views. The remaining parties represented in the council justified their support for 
a plan permitting the mosque to be built on a number of grounds including non-
discrimination (other religious communities have their publicly visible places of 
worship, so why not Muslims?); the value of diversity (especially architectural); 
freedom of religion; integration; and the procedural point that district plans accord-
ing to the planning act only concern strict planning issues and cannot take political 
broader issues, e.g. about Islam or funding, into account.
Although the city council approved the drawing up of a district plan permitting 
the construction of the Ahlul Bait mosque, this accommodating step at the local 
level provided an occasion for the DPP and other critics of Muslims and Islam 
to publicly oppose mosques. The most vocal expression of this development was 
a nation-wide advertising campaign launched by the DPP in September 2009, in 
which the party objected to both the Ahlul Bait and Battery mosques on the grounds 
that they were supposed to be financed from the ‘terror regime’ in Iran and the 
‘dictatorship’ in Saudi-Arabia, respectively. The advertisements were illustrated by 
a manipulated picture of the blue mosque in Istanbul with crossed swords, sym-
bolising the bellicose nature of Islam, placed on the roof, and demanded a popular 
referendum against mosques.
The DPP continued its campaign which gained unexpected momentum when 
a Swiss referendum in November 2009 called for a ban on minarets in that country. 
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The leader of the DPP called for a similar referendum in Denmark, with reference 
to the plans for ‘grand-mosques’ in Copenhagen.
The DPP pursued its campaign in the national parliament. In December 2009 
the DPP asked the minister for integration to elucidate the challenges in terms of 
integration and security posed by the planned construction of ‘grand-mosques’. 
During the debate in parliament in February 2010 the DPP, with explicit reference 
to the two Copenhagen mosque projects, called for a vote on whether Parliament 
should encourage the government and local councils to prevent the construction of 
‘grand-mosques’.3 The proposal did not meet with approval and the parliamentary 
majority instead adopted a resolution stating that religious freedom includes the 
opportunity to establish places of worship and denying allegations that big visible 
mosques obstruct integration or disturb public order as unfounded.
In January 2010 the DPP proposed a Swiss-style consultative referendum on 
whether construction of minarets should be prohibited in Denmark to parliament.4 
At the first reading of the proposal in April, the minister for integration rejected it 
on several grounds, including freedom of religion. A representative of the DPP re-
plied, with partial reference to an old quote by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, 
that the Ahlul Bait mosque to be built in Copenhagen was not a place of worship, 
but ‘a barracks in a campaign of conquest’ and ‘a propaganda centre for the Iranian 
theocracy’. The spokesperson for the DPP objected to minarets as parts of a general 
‘Islamisation’ of Danish society. The proposal was rejected at the second reading in 
May 2010 by all parties in parliament except the DPP.
Meanwhile, in February 2010, the Technical- and Environmental committee in 
Copenhagen had approved the drawing up of a district plan for the Battery project, 
including the Battery mosque. As in the previous case of the Ahlul Bait mosque, the 
DPP committee representative requested a political debate in the city council, this 
time voicing worries about the funding of the project coming from non-moderate 
forces such as Iran. The representatives of the liberal and conservative parties sup-
ported the Battery draft plan, but objected on neutrality grounds to the explicit 
designation in the draft district plan of one building as a ‘Mosque’ rather than as 
a building for ‘cultural purposes’.
When the Battery draft district plan was discussed in the city council in March 
2010, the DPP representatives reiterated their objections to the mosque on the basis 
of concerns about Iranian funding, and denied that it was the job of the city council 
to facilitate the building of a mosque. The other parties represented in the council 
supported the inclusion of provisions for a mosque in the draft district plan on the 
3 http://www.ft.dk/samling/20091/forespoergsel/F18/BEH1/forhandling.htm#dok
4 http://www.ft.dk/samling/20091/beslutningsforslag/B104/som_fremsat.htm#dok
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basis of religious freedom and the value of diversity, and approved the drawing up 
of a district plan designating part of the Battery as a mosque.
Before the approval in the city council of the district plan permitting the build-
ing of the Ahlul Bait mosque in April 2010 a new voice appeared. This time the 
opposition to the mosque project did not come from the DPP or similar Islam- or 
immigration critical quarters, but from a group of Iranian exiles, who demonstrated 
outside the city hall against the links between the Ahlul Bait and the Iranian regime. 
The protest initiative ‘No to Iran’s prestige project’ documented institutional links 
between the transnational Ahlul Bait and the Iranian regime and the involvement 
of the Iranian ambassador to Denmark in the purchase of the Ahlul Bait property 
and warned against Iranian funding of the mosque leading to increased influence of 
the regime in Denmark. The protest initiative even got an audience with the Danish 
Parliament’s committee on immigration- and integration policy in May 2010. The 
protest initiative was publicly supported by local politicians across the political 
spectrum, but only swayed the vote of one representative on the city council from 
the socialist party, herself an Iranian exile.
4 Theoretical Interpretation of the Political Process
Can this political process be interpreted in terms of toleration and respect? Can 
the City Council and/or the Danish state be described as vertically tolerant or re-
spectful in this case? Focusing first on the City Council as an institutional actor, 
note first that the fact that the Technical and Environmental committee in 2009 ini-
tiated work on district plans which would permit the building of mosques was not 
an expression of a specific policy on the part of the city council regarding mosques. 
The planning act requires local councils to draw up district plans when they receive 
applications for construction projects. Here the applications simply happened to 
involve plans for the building of mosques. So the council does not have a general 
‘mosque-policy’; rather, a general procedure for handling building applications is 
in place, which was followed in these particular cases.
Secondly, the decisions reached in the building cases apparently cannot be de-
scribed as either tolerant or respectful in the strict sense introduced in the begin-
ning. This is so insofar as the objection and acceptance components required for 
toleration and respect do not obtain; the council as such does not have or express 
either a negative or positive attitude towards the mosque projects. The acts of the 
council as an institutional actor distinct from the individual members of the council 
can arguably only be described as permissive, not as either tolerant or respectful, 
insofar as toleration and respect require the presence in some form of attitudes 
towards the object of the permission ascribable to the agent in question (Lægaard 
2010a).
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Something similar holds at the state level: Since the proposals from the DPP to 
require councils to oppose ‘grand-mosques’ and for public referenda over minarets 
were both rejected, parliamentary debates did not lead to any decision to intervene 
or change the procedures. The state as such thus remained aloof in relation to the 
handling of the cases in the city council.
Some might describe the case in terms of toleration due to the constitutional role 
of the Evangelical-Lutheran church as the ‘People’s Church of Denmark’ supported 
as such by the state. Muslims might be in a relation of vertical toleration to the 
Danish state simply because the state is (in some, far from obvious sense) Christian. 
Without being able to argue the claim fully here (see Lægaard 2010b), this need not 
be the case. The state does not necessarily object to Muslims or mosques simply 
because it supports the Lutheran church, and in fact the Danish state is not only 
practicing non-interference towards Muslims but positively supports ‘approved’ Is-
lamic religious communities in some ways. The official religious inequality rather 
contributes to the minority status of Danish Muslims; in addition to being a numeri-
cal minority (estimated 4% of the population), Muslims are both economically and 
normatively a minority. They are marked as different and divergent from the norm 
both officially (the Danish state supports the Lutheran church) and in public debate 
(which is dominated by discourses of immigration hostility, cultural assimilation-
ism, and invocations of ‘Danish values’ supposedly difficult to accept for Muslims).
The internal politics in the council and parliament are better places to look for the 
articulation of objection and acceptance components characterising toleration and 
respect: Here there are clear articulations of objections to mosques from the DPP 
and partly from liberals and conservatives. Among the majority there are articula-
tions of both objection and acceptance, the latter voiced as reasons for not diverging 
from standard procedure and for not allowing specific allegations (e.g. concerning 
Iranian funding) as reasons for withholding permission. Appeals to non-discrimina-
tion and freedom of religion might be interpreted as forms of equal respect insofar 
as they both explicitly acknowledge Muslims as having equal standing and publicly 
justify permitting mosques on this basis. One can accordingly describe individual 
members of the council and parliament as tolerant or respectful. But the aggregated 
attitudes of its members arguably cannot be ascribed to the council as such as long 
as it only approves of a district plan but does not publicly affirm reasons for objec-
tion or acceptance.
The council can be described as tolerant in Jones’ broader sense: Even if the 
council as an institutional actor is not tolerant or respectful, it upholds a regime 
of toleration by sticking to the standard procedure for district plans. The coun-
cil thereby prevents forces demanding withholding of building permissions, e.g. 
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as represented by the DPP in the council and parliament, from backing up their 
objections with political power, e.g. in the form of denying building permissions.
Already at this level of political process, intersectionality makes it appearance: 
Insofar as the potential intolerance is located in society in a broader sense (as op-
posed to being a part of the formal constitution of the public authorities) the de-
scription of the council as politically tolerant makes implicit or explicit reference 
to horizontal intolerance of opponents of mosques towards these building projects. 
The description of the council as politically tolerant is only salient and informative 
in relation to the particular case in light of these potentially intolerant horizontal 
relations, which the council’s actions transform into relations of publicly enforced 
toleration. The political toleration in question is accordingly a case of top-down 
intersectional toleration. 
5 Public Debate5
To assess the case in terms horizontal toleration and respect, an empirical inves-
tigation of the distribution of intolerant, tolerant and positive views on mosques 
in the public debate in the media about the cases was conducted. This empirical 
material provides an avenue for assessing extrinsic intersectionality in the case, 
since it makes it possible to investigate the relations between the public debates on 
the case and the political process, between the articulated reasons for views in the 
political and broader public debates, and how the dynamics of the debates unfold.
The investigation was conducted using the database Infomedia, which collects all 
written and electronic media in Denmark. The media survey covers the period from 
January 2009 to September 2010, i.e. the period where the political process took 
place as well as some time before that. Searches were conducted on selected key 
words, namely ‘stormoske’ [‘grand-mosque’], ‘moske’ [mosque], and the names 
of the two Islamic associations responsible for the two mosque projects, namely 
‘Muslimerne Fællesråd’ [The Muslim Council] and ‘Ahlul Bait’ (all including de-
rivatives and variations in spelling).
This survey does not address the issue of agenda setting. Although some of the 
findings reasonably can be understood as driven by the media, the findings of the 
survey do not in themselves measure the agenda setting effect of the media. The 
focus is moreover strictly on Danish media (local as well as national). This na-
tional focus does show that national public debates are part of broader international 
currents, both in terms of the reverberations of specific events in other countries 
(e.g. the Swiss referendum on minarets) and the more general concern with Islam, 
integration and security. The survey does not in itself address the place of the case 
5 The data sets on which the account in this section is based are on file with the author.
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in the international context or comparative issues about similarity or difference 
relative to other cases in other countries, since this is arguably not crucial to the 
interpretation of the specific case in terms of toleration and respect.
The public debate does not necessarily reflect attitudes towards mosques in so-
ciety more broadly. The media are nevertheless crucial to the formation of public 
perceptions, which justified the choice of focus. It might be objected that public 
debate is likely to be dominated by more radical views and not to reflect the pos-
sibly more moderate opinions of a ‘quiet majority’. Even if the public debate is 
skewed in the noted way, the survey can still be used to assess several forms of 
intersectionality: The description of the Council as politically tolerant in Jones’ 
sense does not require any specific level of potential societal intolerance. Participa-
tion in public debate is arguably an important aspect Forst’s ‘respect conception’ 
concerning citizens in their capacity as law-makers. And extrinsic intersectionality 
between the political process and the public debate will be of independent interest 
in understanding the case, whether or not the public debate reflects broader at-
titudes correctly or not.
The objection is further addressed by incorporating a partial test of the degree to 
which the public debate is skewed in the survey design: While the term ‘stormoske’ 
literally means ‘grand-mosque’, its use in the Danish debate does not necessarily 
signify anything about the actual size or the special status of the buildings in ques-
tion. According to Infomedia, the term first appeared in Danish media with reference 
to a Danish context in December 1990 and February 1991 as part of the coverage of 
a proposal from the Progress Party, an anti-taxation and immigration-hostile protest 
party from parts of which the DPP later evolved. In November 1990 PP members of 
parliament, including the latter founder of the DPP, proposed a bill to parliament to 
cancel the lease of the Battery plot to a Muslim association for the purpose of build-
ing a mosque, which the bill referred to as a ‘stormoske’. The term ‘stormoske’ 
makes its appearance in the public media as part of the subsequent news coverage 
of and public debate over the Battery lease. One might therefore hypothesize that 
use of the term reflects the PP’s original view of mosques as inherently problematic 
and that the terminology functions as a discursive framing of mosque projects as 
more problematic and even threatening than the more simple label ‘mosque’ might 
suggest. For the DPP’s part, this was confirmed during the parliamentary debate in 
February 2010, where the spokesman of the DPP admitted that they considered any 
visible mosque with dome or minarets as a ‘grand-mosque’. The separate searches 
on uses of ‘stormoske’ and ‘moske’ provides a test of the hypothesis that the former 
is not a neutral descriptive term but a politically loaded label, which might suggest 
the minimal degree to which the public debate over-represents more radical views.
72
‘Grand-Mosque’ Projects in Copenhagen: Intersections of Respect, 
Tolerance and Intolerance in the Distribution of Public Space Sune Lægaard
The results of the searches were sorted in several stages: At the first quantitative 
stage strict news coverage and opinion pieces were separated. The former (reports, 
news telegrams etc. not arguing a particular view) were counted and ordered ac-
cording to date. The latter (letters to the editor, interviews etc. articulating a view) 
were ordered by date and sorted in to three categories: ‘intolerant’ (pieces arguing 
for not permitting the mosques), ‘tolerant’ (pieces articulating some negative view 
of mosques but nevertheless arguing that they should be permitted), and ‘positive’ 
(pieces articulating some positive view of mosques and in favour of permitting 
them). At this level of categorisation, ‘positive’ includes all views arguing for per-
mitting mosques with no accompanying negative view, so it covers all reasons for 
permission, not just equal respect views.
At the second stage a qualitative reading was conducted of a subset of the entire 
sample selected on the basis of the degree of articulation of the views expressed 
and whether the author of the view was of special interest, e.g. prominent public 
figures, representatives of political parties, groups or organisations relevant to the 
case. The selected sub-set was studied to determine the more precise justifications 
for the more general stances, i.e. which objections to mosques informed intoler-
ant or tolerant views, and which positive considerations were given as reasons for 
permitting mosques.
The survey shows the use in the public media of the key terms to be closely cor-
related with central dates in the political process. There are almost no occurrences 
in Danish media of the key terms in 2009 before the issue appears on the agenda for 
the meeting of the technical- and environmental committee on 24 June 2009. This 
first wave consists of 59 news items on ‘Ahlul Bait’, ‘moske’ and ‘stormoske’ on 
the day following the meeting. The first wave generates little public debate.
The second wave follows on the council meeting on 27 August 2009 approv-
ing the work on the district plan. The same day the media had 42 news items on 
‘Ahlul Bait’, ‘stormoske’ and ‘moske’ and 41 the next day. Then, after a few days 
with only a little debate, things explode: 1 September 2009 sees 73 news items on 
‘stormoske’, and the next four days 77, together with a barrage of opinion pieces 
all using the term ‘stormoske’ (over 30 the first week of September). The factor 
triggering this third wave is a news story about the funding for the Ahlul Bait 
mosque supposedly coming from Iran, a subsequent demand for financial transpar-
ency for any mosque project made by a prominent member of parliament from the 
Conservative party, which the DPP tops by a demand that all permissions to build 
‘grand-mosques’ are withdrawn. 
After a week of debate mostly about the Iranian funding of the Ahlul Bait 
mosque, the fourth wave is initiated on 9 September 2009 by the DPP’s nation-wide 
campaign featuring manipulated pictures of the blue mosque, which is extensively 
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covered in the media (65 news items the same day using the terms ‘stormoske’ 
and ‘moske’). This generates a huge amount of opinion pieces (67 using the term 
‘stormoske’ the next three weeks), which for the first time are polarised and mainly 
intolerant: Whereas the first week of September saw only 1 positive, 24 tolerant and 
8 intolerant opinion pieces using the term ‘stormoske’, the three weeks after the 
DPP’s campaign generated 11 positive, 17 tolerant and 39 intolerant opinion pieces 
using the same term.
During fall 2009 ‘stormoske’ is mainly used in relation to news stories about 
the projected Battery mosque and disagreements between the developer and the 
Muslim Council. This phase generates relatively little public debate, but now with 
a clear tendency towards intolerance (1 positive, 3 tolerant and 13 intolerant opin-
ion pieces using ‘stormoske’ in October and November).
The fifth wave is triggered by the Swiss referendum on minarets and the sub-
sequent demand from the DPP leader for a similar referendum in Denmark: Over 
100 news items use the term ‘stormoske’ on 29 November 2009 and the two follow-
ing days. The resulting opinion pieces replicate the earlier noted tendency towards 
intolerance (1 positive, 6 tolerant and 9 intolerant pieces using the term ‘stormoske’ 
in the weeks following the referendum).
The sixth wave of news coverage and public debate ensues when the city coun-
cil on 15 February 2010 publishes the first draft of a district plan for the battery 
project. A prominent tabloid paper, Ekstra Bladet, seizes the opportunity to launch 
a journalistic campaign about the projected ‘grand-mosque’ on its internet based 
popular opinion page ‘the Nation’. Unsurprisingly, given Ekstra Bladet’s immi-
gration hostile record, the result is a new wave of debate with a strong tendency 
towards intolerant views.
The seventh wave is triggered by the council meeting on 15 April 2010 approving 
the district plan for the Ahlul Bait mosque, before which the protest initiative ‘No 
to Iran’s prestige project’ demonstrated outside the city hall. The debate focuses on 
the funding coming from Iran and criticisms of the Iranian regime and is mostly 
intolerant (only 1 positive, but 12 tolerant and 15 intolerant opinion pieces using 
the term ‘stormoske’).
At the general quantitative level, the survey suggests that the news coverage and 
public debate is a function of five factors: 1) The district planning process, 2) the 
story of Iranian funding, 3) the DPP’s campaign, 4) the Swiss referendum, and 
5) Ekstra Bladet’s journalistic campaign. There is hardly any news coverage or 
public debate independently of these factors. The funding story and Swiss refer-
endum furthermore mainly generate so much coverage and debate because they 
are taken up by national politicians (especially from the DPP). So the coverage 
and public debate seems to be directed by the political process at the local level 
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and the political debate at the national level. The public debate furthermore leans 
increasingly towards intolerance, the DPP’s campaign apparently marking the tip-
ping point.
As a methodological caveat it should be noted that the survey only demonstrates 
correlations, not causality. But this also points to an important qualification regard-
ing the lessons that can be drawn from a study like the present one: Whereas the 
waves of intolerance mainly seem to be triggered by interventions of the DPP, 
and to some lesser extent by other political actors, it gives no reasons to believe 
that these interventions are either necessary or sufficient for the observed rises in 
intolerance. Most importantly, there may be further background preconditions for 
intolerant views that are merely activated or tapped into by political interventions. 
So one cannot, for instance, conclude on the basis of the noted correlations that the 
DPP is solely responsible for the documented intolerance in the public debate.
The distribution of intolerant, tolerant and respectful views displays some in-
teresting features both when comparing the views expressed using different terms 
and the distribution of views between 2009 and 2010. The politically loaded nature 
of the term ‘stormoske’ relative to the term ‘moske’ is clearly confirmed by the 
survey. Of all the opinion pieces using the former term, 10% are positive, 32% tol-
erant, and 54% intolerant, whereas the distribution of those using the latter term is 
30% positive, 36% tolerant, and 34% intolerant. So attitudes clearly correlate with 
choice of terminology. The development over time is also striking: In 2009, of all 
the registered opinion pieces (all four key terms), 15% were positive, 36% tolerant 
and 46% intolerant. In 2010, this had changed to 11% positive, 30% tolerant and 
59% intolerant. This shift towards more intolerant views is also clear even within 
the category of opinion pieces using the more neutral term ‘moske’: Where 38% 
of these were positive, 35% tolerant, and 27% intolerant in 2009, this changes to 
15% positive, 39% tolerant, and 44% intolerant in 2010. This shift is probably 
due to the greater saliency in 2010 of concerns about the Iranian funding of the 
Ahlul Bait mosque apparently shared by many who do not see mosques as such as 
problematic.
At the selective and qualitative level, the main picture is that the same reasons 
are advanced in the public debate as originally formulated by members of the city 
council and reiterated in parliament; with minor exceptions, no reasons for either 
objection or acceptance are expressed in opinion pieces that were not already ar-
ticulated in the political debate. 
The main reasons against the building of mosques are: 1) security (fear of ex-
tremism and radicalisation), 2) general anti-Islamicism (objections to political Is-
lamism, gender inequality, undemocratic nature of Islam), 3) funding coming from 
Iran or Saudi-Arabia, 4) aesthetics (foreign architecture, size), 5) the neutrality of 
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the district plan (the reference to a mosque – this procedural concern is only voiced 
in the city council), 6) public presence (Denmark is a Christian country, Muslims 
are welcome, but should practice in private), 7) religious representativity (there 
should not be a shia mosque, since there are so few shias in Copenhagen – this is 
not voiced politically), 8) problems of integration (a ‘grand mosque’ will result in 
segregation and worse integration).
The reasons for permitting mosques are: 9) planning act procedure (the act does 
not allow decision on district plans to take controversial political and religious is-
sues into account – this procedural point is mostly formulated politically), 10) free-
dom of religion, 11) non-discrimination, 12) integration and inclusion, 13) the 
value of diversity. All of these reasons for permission can be interpreted as forms 
of, or as based on concerns with, equal respect for Muslims. This is of course just 
a possible (although plausible) interpretation of the voiced reasons, which could 
also be pragmatically or strategically motivated. The analysis is concerned with the 
underlying intentions of actors, however, only with the views actually expressed 
in the public debate. Reasons 9-11 share the formal feature of treating all citizens 
equally in specific dimensions, which is what motivates the interpretation in terms 
of equal respect. Reasons 12-13 are more plausibly interpreted as expressions of the 
view that Muslims are valuable members of society.
The most prominent reasons voiced against mosques are reasons having to 
do with general criticism of Islam, e.g. for being undemocratic or oppressing wom-
en, and second to that concerns for security (radicalisation) and funding (from Iran 
and Saudi-Arabia). The objection having to do with funding is almost non-existing 
before the end of august 2009 and becomes much more prominent in 2010. This is 
especially the case for tolerant views, among which concerns about Iranian funding 
loom larger in 2010 than in 2009. Many who were not worried about mosques be-
fore the story about Iranian funding became so afterwards, and many who objected 
to mosques all along (e.g. the DPP) use the funding story as an additional reason or 
even translate their original dislike of Islam as such into apparently more publicly 
palatable worries about giving the Tehran regime influence in Denmark.
Among reasons for permitting mosques, freedom of religion seems to be the most 
prominent, although the reasons for acceptance are generally less clearly articu-
lated than the reasons for objection.
6 Conclusion: The Intersectionality of Toleration and Respect
Respect, toleration and intolerance are central to understanding of the Danish 
mosque case. A description of the case that did not detail the articulation of reasons 
for acceptance and objection in the political and public debate would make it in-
comprehensible why such an apparently routine building permission case could be 
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so controversial and occupy so much space in the political process and media. One 
cannot understand the political debates unfolding in the case or why mosque build-
ing became a political issue at all without understanding how it involves questions 
about toleration and respect. Toleration and respect are thus central to any adequate 
description and understanding of the case. This is so whether or not one also adopts 
a normative perspective on the case, although the articulated reasons of objection 
and acceptance gain additional saliency if one approaches the case from the point 
of view of, e.g., religious freedom in general or concerns with the position of the 
Muslim minority in particular.
On the other hand, descriptions of either the public authorities as simply per-
missive or of public opinion as predominantly intolerant also seem inadequate or 
even misleading. The case is not simply one of unproblematic permissiveness on 
the basis of religious freedom, nor is it merely one of pervasive popular intoler-
ance and Islamophobia. The development of the case can only be understood 
by taking both the permissiveness of public authorities and the articulation of 
increasingly intolerant views in public debate into consideration and by noting 
their interrelations. 
One general finding of the paper thus is that attention to two-dimensionality and 
intersectionality seems crucial to an adequate description and understanding of 
the case, not just for the purpose of assessments of it in term of normative ideals 
such as Forst’s democratic respect conception or Galeotti’s toleration as recogni-
tion. Normative ideals such as these can be shown at the purely theoretical level 
to turn on specific intersections of political and social relations not captured by 
one-dimensional calls for tolerance. This paper shows empirically how this kind 
of two-dimensionality and intersectionality is also required for descriptive and 
interpretative purposes. This is not a trivial point, since cases of toleration, and 
especially of intolerance, are often simple in the sense that the attitudes of public 
authorities correspond to popular attitudes; in many places where authorities have 
denied building permission to mosques or minarets, this reflects popular dislike or 
fear of Muslims or Islam. But the Danish case is different in that the horizontal and 
vertical relations do not correspond so neatly. So to adequately describe it, we need 
to introduce two-dimensionality into the conceptual framework, and to understand 
it we have to consider the various possible form of intersectionality between the 
two dimensions.
The structuring of the data in terms of positive, tolerant and intolerant views 
provides a prism illuminating both the dynamics of the case over time and the 
relationships between the vertical and horizontal level; this interpretative perspec-
tive reveals to what extent the public debate is conditioned and even dictated by 
the political process and debate, both in terms of triggering factors, the distribution 
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and dynamics of views, and the reasons given for the views. This is an interest-
ing example of what I have called extrinsic intersectionality. The investigation in 
these terms shows the agenda setting force of the political process in at least two 
dimensions: First, the public debate on mosque issues is apparently triggered by 
the political process and the meetings of the political bodies are among the main 
factors initiating the waves of public debate. Secondly, the reasons for objection 
and acceptance articulated in the public debate mirrors those formulated in the 
political process. These two aspects of intersectionality give a picture of the public 
debate as almost determined by the political process. A third aspect changes this 
picture, however, in that the majority view in both the city council and parliament 
is revealed as an increasingly embattled minority view in the public debate. The 
public debate is thus independent from the political process, but not autonomous, 
since it is apparently the skilful instrumentalisation of the mosque issue by specific 
political actors (especially the DPP) that propels the shift towards increasing intol-
erance in the public debate.
The survey further substantiates the description of Muslims in Denmark as a mi-
nority in the noted qualitative sense. The increasingly intolerant response supports 
Galeotti’s hypothesis that the perceived divergence of minorities tends to transform 
issues involving requests by minority groups into problems of toleration despite 
the formal equality in liberal states; as soon as minorities make requests for public 
presence, they go from being more or less invisible to being a challenge to the 
majority’s norms, which generates popular opposition (Galeotti 2002: 90-93). The 
survey supports the characterisation of Muslims as a minority in the normative 
sense. It further indicates that prospects of having visible mosques are considered 
as deviances from the norm in Denmark in a way triggering intolerant attitudes, at 
least when these deviances are instrumentalised politically for this purpose.
As further discussed in the introduction, there are prominent normative positions 
according to which toleration should not merely consist in permissions, but should 
be explicitly justified with reference to equal respect. If toleration is based on equal 
respect, it is not a way of entrenching power asymmetries between minority and 
majority, but a way of including minorities as full and equal citizens. The survey 
suggests that one way of understanding this claim might be overly optimistic: If the 
claim is understood as an empirical prediction of the effects of justifying permis-
sions in terms of respect, then it is not confirmed in this case. Even though the 
majority in both the city council and the national parliament invoke freedom of re-
ligion, non-discrimination and similar reasons plausibly understood as expressions 
of equal respect as justifications for sticking to a planning procedure that results 
in permissions to build mosques, this apparently has no positive effects on public 
opinion – in fact, the opposite seems to be the case.
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There are many qualifications to this assessment, however. First, the views ex-
pressed in public debate may not be representative, or the change in public opinion 
might take longer to materialise. There are weak indications that this is the case: 
The difference in views expressed using the terms ‘stormoske’ and ‘moske’ sug-
gests an over-representation of intolerant views in the public debate. Further, two 
opinion polls conducted during the period may be interpreted as indicating a move-
ment towards less intolerance.6 Second, the claim might be that it is not sufficient 
merely to stick to the ordinary procedure; perhaps the invocation of equal respect 
as a reason for permissions should rather be a distinct affirmative act infusing the 
permission with symbolic meaning (Galeotti 2002), e.g. in the form of public state-
ments by prominent representatives of the council in their official capacities rather 
than by individual members of the council. Thirdly, even if no actual effect of the 
envisaged sort occurs, the respect view might still be upheld as a purely normative 
ideal about what justice requires in cases like this.
While the investigation does not in itself say anything about how such cases 
should be handled, it provides information that is strategically relevant if one is 
trying to figure out how to translate specific normative ideals into practice in simi-
lar cases. One apparent lesson is that public opinion, at least to the extent this is 
expressed in public debate, is both very much conditioned by political process and 
debate, but is far from an automatic function of official policies. Even if a political 
body invokes a given value as justification for permissions, there is no guarantee 
that this value will inform views in the public debate. The extent to which the pub-
lic debate develops out of political instrumentalisation of both internal and external 
factors (e.g. the funding story and the Swiss referendum) indicates that symbolic 
invocations of the equal status of minorities as justification of public decisions is 
certainly not sufficient to remove minority status. Worse for proponents of multi-
culturalist policies of recognition, such invocations may actually further entrench 
the minority status and exclusion of a group requesting increased public presence. 
So two kinds of intersectionality may work against each other in cases like this: 
Normative ideals of equal respect may be intrinsically intersectional in the sense 
6 Immediately following the Swiss minaret referendum the research institute Megafon asked over 
1000 people what they would vote if a referendum on banning or permitting minarets were to be 
held in Denmark? 51% answered that they would vote for a ban, 34% for permission and 15% 
did not know. In August 2010 the research institute Rambøll asked 970 people whether it would 
annoy them if a mosque with a minaret were built in the local area? 49,7% answered ‘yes’, 48% 
‘no’ and 2,2% ‘don’t know’. These two representative polls are not strictly comparable, since the 
questions are different. But they indicate a less negative attitude towards mosques and minarets in 
2010 than in 2009: the positive group is now almost as big as the negative group, and ‘being an-
noyed’ is arguably a less negative attitude than actually voting in favour of a ban at a referendum. 
One might be annoyed but still not be in favour of a ban, e.g. because of respect for freedom of 
religion, in which case one qualifies as tolerant. So the negative group in the second poll includes 
both intolerant as well as tolerant attitudes to minarets.
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that they require public authorities to work (vertically) for an increased acceptance 
of difference in social (horizontal) relations among citizens (this is arguable part of 
the European Union discourse on ‘equal treatment’, which then prescribes a form 
of top-down intrinsic intersectionality). But such ideals can run up against extrinsic 
intersectionality, either in the form of bottom-up popular reactions to institutional 
impositions, or, more likely, against political instrumentalisation of the issues thus 
placed on the popular agenda. The latter may be what happened in the Danish 
case. The political response by the DPP to the prospects of building permissions 
for mosques did not succeed in halting the political process towards this result 
significantly. But it arguably prevented this political process from functioning as 
an occasion for fostering more positive and accepting attitudes towards Muslims 
and mosques in the public debate. Whether the Mosques will in fact be built is now 
primarily a matter of funding, which the political instrumentalisation of the issue 
has turned into a volatile subject that the media are certain to remain watchful and 
suspicious towards for some time. If the mosques are eventually built, this might 
move the debate and the broader popular and political focus on Muslims in new 
directions. But for the time being, the Danish mosque case is a peculiar one of 
political permissibility coupled with intolerance in the public debate.
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